




Experimenting with Unlikely Partners 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Congress created the Clean Water Act it distinguished 
between point sources, “discernible, confined, and discrete 
conveyance[s]” like paper mills and sewage treatment plants that 
discharge pollutants,
1
 and nonpoint sources
2
 of diffuse runoff pollution 
(like farms and city streets).  Congress did not address diffuse nonpoint 
source pollution with the same prescriptive standards and permits it 




The results are not particularly surprising.  After more than 40 years 
of implementing the Clean Water Act, diffuse runoff is the single biggest 
                                                          
       *  Melissa Scanlan is an Associate Professor, Associate Dean, and Director of the 
Environmental Law Center at Vermont Law School.  The author is grateful for the prior work, ideas, 
and comments on drafts from other legal scholars, in particular, Professors Robin Kundis Craig, 
David Olson, Jack Tuholske, and engaged critique from participants during the 2013 Vermont Law 
School Environmental Law Scholarship Colloquium and the University of Kansas Law Review 
Symposium. 
 1.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006). 
 2.  40 C.F.R. § 35.1605–4 (2014). 
 3.  In the 1987 Clean Water Act Amendments, Congress attempted to address nonpoint source 
pollution by adding the section 319 Nonpoint Source Management Program, 33 U.S.C. § 1329, and 
the 1990 Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments, which added the Coastal Nonpoint 
Pollution Program, 16 U.S.C. § 1455b.  The Nonpoint Source Management Program authorizes the 
EPA to provide grants to states implementing management programs to reduce nonpoint source 
pollution in navigable waterways.  33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)–(i) (2006).  To receive funding, states must 
identify waterways that require a reduction in nonpoint source pollution to achieve and maintain 
water quality; identify categories of significant nonpoint source pollutants; outline the process for 
identifying best management practices; and identify state and local programs for addressing nonpoint 
source pollution.  § 1329(h)(1)(i), (a)(1).  Similarly, the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program 
provides grants to states implementing management programs to reduce nonpoint source pollution in 
coastal waters.  16 U.S.C. § 1455b(f) (2006).  To receive funding under this program, states must 
identify coastal waters and adjacent areas threatened by “reasonably foreseeable increases in 
pollution” and land uses contributing to the degradation of coastal waters and implement and 
continually revise management measures necessary to achieve and maintain water quality.  § 
1455b(b)(1)–(3).   
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source of water quality problems in the United States.
4
  Agriculture is the 
leading contributor to water quality problems in streams and rivers, 




Now, the EPA, some states, and regulated point sources are pushing 
to bridge this regulatory gap by setting up water quality trading 
programs.
6
  In theory, trading would allow regulated industries and 
municipal sewage plants (point sources) to pay largely unregulated farms 
(nonpoint sources) to reduce nutrient pollution in lakes, rivers and 
streams. 
However, to date, water quality trading has produced more smoke 
than fire.
7
  Although the EPA has been promoting trading for almost 
                                                          
 4.  According to the EPA: 
The United States has made tremendous advances in the past 25 years to clean up the 
aquatic environment by controlling pollution from industries and sewage treatment 
plants.  Unfortunately, we did not do enough to control pollution from diffuse, or 
nonpoint, sources.  Today, nonpoint source (NPS) pollution remains the Nation’s largest 
source of water quality problems.  It’s the main reason that approximately 40 percent of 
our surveyed rivers, lakes, and estuaries are not clean enough to meet basic uses such as 
fishing or swimming. 
Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Nation’s Largest Water Quality Problem, EPA, http://water.epa.gov 
/polwaste/nps/outreach/point1.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Nonpoint Source 
Pollution]. 
See also U.S. E.P.A., NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2004 
REPORTING CYCLE EPA 841-R-08-001, at 14–15, 18, 22 (2009), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/305b/upload/2009_01_22_305b_2004report_2004_305
Breport.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY].  Of the assessed bodies of water, 
44% of the miles of streams and rivers, 64% of lakes, and 30% of bays and estuaries were impaired.  
Id. at 13, 16, 22.  Sources of pollution categorized as diffuse runoff have been ranked as the top 
impairment causes.  Nutrients and sediments are in the top ten “causes” of river and stream 
impairments, with nutrients impairing 38,632 miles and sediments impairing 35,177 miles. Id. at 15. 
Agriculture (“crop production, grazing, and animal feeding operations”) is the number one “cause” 
of stream and river impairment and the third highest source of impairment for lakes. Id. at 15–16, 19.  
Agricultural runoff impairs 94,182 stream and river miles, 1,670,513 lake acres, and 792 square 
miles of estuaries.  Id. at 15–16, 19, 23.  In reality, the scope of impairment is likely much larger, 
considering that 84% of the total U.S. river and stream miles, 61% of the total U.S. lakes, and 71% 
of the total bays and estuaries are unassessed.  Id. at 13, 17, 20. 
 5.  NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY, supra note 4, at 16.  However, the EPA has 
consistently ranked municipal point sources as another leading source of impairment.  Nonpoint 
Source Pollution, supra note 4.  
 6.  This push in the area of water quality trading is just a subset of a larger emphasis on 
markets as a solution to achieving environmental goals, which has existed for the last three decades.  
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Climate Disruption, the Washington Consensus, and Water Law Reform, 81 
TEMP. L. REV. 383, 399 (2008).  Prof. Dellapenna laid bare the problems with water markets as a 
solution to water quantity problems, but did not address markets for trading water quality.  Id. at 
410–22. 
 7.  See Karen Fisher-Vanden & Sheila Omstead, Moving Pollution Trading from Air to Water: 
Potential, Problems, and Prognosis, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 147, 147 (2013), available at http://pubs. 
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three decades, the number of water quality trading programs with actual 
trading has been very small.
8
  The EPA has had a water quality trading 
policy since 2003, allowing sources of pollution to buy and sell pollution 
reductions in order to manage the costs of pollution control.
9
  Yet, only 
twenty-four programs have had any water quality trading.
10
  Within these 
programs, only 100 facilities have taken part in water quality trading, and 
80% of all trades in the U.S. have been in Long Island Sound.
11
 
Notably, the trading activity has mainly taken place between 
regulated point sources.
12
  Only ten programs have experienced any 
trading between point and nonpoint sources, and some of these involved 
only one exchange.
13
  Trading nutrients with unregulated farms is so 
untested in the field that when Pennsylvania, a Chesapeake Bay state, 
approved a policy of point to nonpoint source water quality trading in 
December 2006, a Sea Grant report described this as the “first state to 
                                                          
aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.27.1.147 (“While nearly three dozen water pollution trading 
programs have been established in the United States, many have seen no trading at all, and few are 
operating on a scale that could be considered economically significant.”); Dennis M. King  &  Peter 
J. Kuch, Will Nutrient Credit Trading Ever Work?  An Assessment of Supply and Demand Problems 
and Institutional Obstacles, 33 ENVTL. L. REV. 10352, 10352 (2003), available at 
http://www.envtn.org/uploads/ELR_trading_article.PDF (noting that “very few nutrient credit trades 
have actually taken place”). 
 8.  The first water quality trade was on Lake Dillon, Colorado, in 1986.  List of All Trading 
Programs, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/trading/upload/ 
tradingprograminfo.xls (last visited Mar. 24, 2014) [hereinafter List of All Trading Programs]; see 
generally Hanna L. Breetz et al., Water Quality Trading and Offset Initiatives in the U.S.: A 
Comprehensive Survey, U.S. E.P.A. (2004), available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/watersheds 
/docs/ptpac/DartmouthCompTradingSurvey.pdf (cataloguing development of trading programs). 
 9.  EPA Water Quality Trading Policy, Issuance of Final Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 1608-01, 1609 
(Jan. 13, 2003). 
 10.  List of All Trading Programs, supra note 8. 
 11.  EPA Water Quality Trading Evaluation, U.S. E.P.A. at 1-2 (2008), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/evaluate/pdf/water/epa-water-quality-trading-evaluation.pdf [hereinafter Water 
Quality Trading Evaluation]. This low level of usage exists despite the EPA’s provision of policy 
guidance (most recently updated in 2003), tools and guidance documents for states, training courses, 
and grants to state and local trading programs.  Id.  See also List of All Trading Programs, supra 
note 8.   
 12.  List of All Trading Programs, supra note 8. 
 13.  Id.  In the EPA’s 2008 water quality trading evaluation, it noted that twenty-five trading 
programs have been launched, but “relatively few trading programs have been scaled up from pilot 
projects to permanent programs, and even fewer can claim to have had a significant impact in 
improving water quality or reducing pollutant control costs.”  Water Quality Trading Evaluation, 
supra note 11, at 1-2.  The ten programs that involve point to nonpoint source trading are: Red Cedar 
River, Wisconsin; Great Miami River, Ohio; NYC Phosphorus Offset Program; Southern Minnesota 
Beet Sugar Cooperative; Rahr Malting Company, Minnesota; Pinnacle (Vlasic Foods), Delaware; 
Lake Dillon Reservoir, Colorado; Cherry Creek, Colorado; Chatfield Reservoir, Colorado; and Bear 
Creek, Colorado.  List of All Trading Programs, supra note 8. 
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embrace point–nonpoint source exchanges on a wide scale.”
14
  As of 
2013, this Pennsylvania program has not yet produced any actual trades 
with nonpoint sources. 
Despite the lack of success in controlling agricultural pollution 
through trading, the EPA and some states are presenting trading as a key 
tool for addressing contemporary problems in major watersheds, such as 
the Chesapeake Bay,
15
 the Ohio River Basin,
16
 and the Great Lakes.
17
  
Indeed, in the EPA’s overall plan for trading, the agency envisions states 
adopting nutrient criteria and Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) 




The governmental push for water quality trading in these and other 
watersheds is sometimes accompanied by an encouragement to use 
adaptive management; however, programs provide little detail about 
implementation of this approach.  Even so, water quality trading 
programs could benefit from adaptive management, given the reliance on 
trading as an antidote to persistent nutrient and sediment impairment and 
the fact that trading is still in its experimental phase.  Taking an adaptive 
approach to trading between point and nonpoint sources could increase 
the likelihood of understanding system dynamics and creating the 
transparency essential to deciding whether this regulatory tool is capable 
                                                          
 14.  Stephanie Showalter & Sarah Spigener, Pennsylvania’s Nutrient Trading Program: Legal 
Issues and Challenges 2 (Nat’l Sea Grant Law Ctr., White Paper, 2007), available at 
http://nsglc.olemiss.edu/WQT.pdf. 
 15.  Chesapeake Bay TMDL 10.3–10.4, U.S. E.P.A. (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/FinalBayTMDL/CBayFinalTMDLSection10_final.p
df; id. at 8-27 (allowing trading in Pennsylvania), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/FinalBayTMDL/CBayFinalTMDLSection8_final.pd
f; id. at 8-32 (allowing trading in West Virginia).  This follows an earlier tributary strategy in 
Pennsylvania that identified a 27,000 pound phosphorus shortfall in nonpoint source reductions in 
the Susquehanna Basin and proposed nutrient credit trading by Publicly Owned Treatment Works to 
make up the difference.  Showalter & Spigener, supra note 14, at 5.  
 16.  Brydon Ross, IN, KY, and OH Sign Largest Credit Trading Program for Water Pollution, 
KNOWLEDGE CTR., COUNCIL FOR STATE GOV’TS (Aug. 9, 2012, 3:55 PM), 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/ky-and-oh-sign-largest-credit-trading-program-water-
pollution. 
 17.  See generally Nancy Frank & Sahana Goswami, Our Waters: Water Quality Trading (Se. 
Wis. Watersheds Trust, Inc., White Paper, 2012), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/137233107/Water-Quality-Trading-White-Paper-June-2012 (reviewing 
the status of water quality trading in Wisconsin).  The water quality trading approach allows 
producers of nonpoint source pollutants to choose between reducing the end-of-pipe pollutant 
concentrations and entering into trade agreements with other producers in the watershed to achieve 
the same result.  Id. at 2. 
 18.  See Water Quality Trading Evaluation, supra note 11, at 1–4. 
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of solving the problem presented by unregulated nonpoint source 
pollution.  However, implementation of adaptive management in the 
trading context raises a variety of complexities.  Without clearly sorting 
through those issues, adaptive management becomes “magic words” that 
fail to deliver an improvement in water quality. 
This article discusses how adaptive management could be applied to 
nutrient trading programs to satisfy the informational needs of policy 
makers charged with advancing water quality.  Section I frames the 
agricultural nonpoint source water pollution dilemma within the context 
of the Clean Water Act.  It outlines the range of possible solutions, and 
the EPA’s focus on water quality trading.  Section II discusses the use of 
the term “adaptive management” in conjunction with water quality 
trading programs in the Chesapeake Bay, Ohio River, Wisconsin 
(impacting waters that empty into the Great Lakes and Mississippi 
River), Rogue River, Willamette River, and Lower Boise River.  This 
section highlights the lack of specificity about how to apply adaptive 
management.  Section III, adaptive trading, identifies the information 
necessary for nutrient trading involving nonpoint sources and suggests a 
more defined approach to applying adaptive management. 
I. NONPOINT AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION DILEMMA 
A. Extent of Water Pollution from Agriculture and Clean Water Act 
Approach 
Congress distinguished point from nonpoint sources of pollution 
when it created the Clean Water Act (CWA).  Section 502(14) of the 
CWA defines “point source” as readily identifiable sources of pollution, 
such as discharge pipes.
19
  Point sources are regulated with the National 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) or state equivalent 
permits that apply water quality and technology standards, among other 
requirements, and impose legal liability for violations.
20
 
By contrast, Congress defined “nonpoint source” as “any source of 
                                                          
 19.  Specifically, a “point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, 
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, 
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged.  This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges 
and return flows from irrigated agriculture.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 20.  National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), U.S. E.P.A., 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/cwa.cfm?program_id=45 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (citing CWA 
sections relating to the NPDES Permit Program). 
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water pollution that does not meet the definition of ‘point source’ in 
section 502(14)”.
21
  This is diffuse runoff from land, and can include 




Nonpoint source pollution is the largest persistent category of water 
pollution in the U.S., which by definition is diffuse, varied, and 
unregulated at the federal level.
23
  According to the EPA, agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution is the leading cause of impairments to 
surveyed rivers and streams.
24
  Hence, agriculture is key to the nonpoint 
source pollution problem, which is to say the water pollution problem, 
and the solution to that problem. 
The dilemma presented when trying to address agricultural water 
pollution is wrapped up in the breadth and diversity of the field level 
management practices and landscape factors that contribute to it.  The 
agricultural activities that lead to these impairments include “poorly 
located or managed animal feeding operations; overgrazing; plowing too 
often or at the wrong time; and improper, excessive or poorly timed 
application of pesticides, irrigation water and fertilizer.”
25
  Add to that 
the fact that these activities are taking place on more than 330 million 
acres of U.S. land.
26
  Unlike applying an end-of-pipe technology to 
                                                          
 21.  What Is Nonpoint Source Pollution?, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/ 
polwaste/nps/whatis.cfm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY, supra note 4, at 14–15, 18, 22.  Of the assessed 
stream and river miles, 44% are impaired.  Id. at 13.  Agriculture (“crop production, grazing, and 
animal feeding operations”) is the number one “cause” of stream and river impairment, impairing 
94,182 miles.  Id. at 15–16.  For assessed lakes, a much higher percentage than rivers and streams 
were impaired: 64%.  Id. at 16.  Agriculture is the third highest source of impairment, impairing 
1,670,513 lake acres.  Id. at 19.  Of the assessed bays and estuaries, 30% are impaired.  Id. at 20.  
Unlike lakes, rivers and streams, agriculture is the ninth source of estuary/bay impairment, impairing 
792 square miles.  Id. at 23.  
According to the findings of the National Research Council,  
The Clean Water Act has been effective in addressing point sources of water pollutants.  
Notably, however, the Clean Water Act addresses nonpoint source pollution only in a 
limited, indirect manner.  This is a crucial difference given the significance of nonpoint 
source water pollution throughout the nation and its special importance to Mississippi 
River and northern Gulf of Mexico water quality.   
Nat’l Research Council Comm. on the Mississippi River and Clean Water Act, Mississippi River 
Water Quality and Clean Water Act: Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities, at 6 (2008), available 
at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12051&page=1.  
 24.  Agriculture, U.S. E.P.A., http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/agriculture.cfm (last updated 
Sept. 9, 2013).  However, this EPA statement is based on data reported in 2000 and a survey of a 
minority of all water bodies in the U.S., which may not accurately reflect the reality of the problem. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
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control point source water pollution, these polluting activities involve 
farm management practices, which will have varying impacts based on a 
variety of local environmental and landscape factors. 
In contrast to the prescriptive approach applied to point sources, 
which sets pollution limits and requires permits, neither state nor federal 
government have applied similar regulatory methods to nonpoint source 
agricultural pollution.
27
  According to the National Research Council, in 
its study of impairments to the massive Mississippi River Basin, the 
“Clean Water Act contains no authorities that directly regulate nonpoint 
sources . . . .”
28
  Instead, of regulating these sources, the EPA points out 
that “[t]here are many government programs available to help farmers 
and ranchers design and pay for management approaches to prevent and 
control [nonpoint source] pollution.”
29
 
Despite Congress’s express commitment in the Clean Water Act to 
control water pollution, the act’s language fails to ensure effective 
control of nonpoint source pollution.
30
  Initially, the Clean Water Act 
focused on municipal and industrial point sources.  Section 208 of the 
Act addressed nonpoint source pollution by requiring states to create 
comprehensive water quality plans;
31
 but Section 208 failed to require 
implementation, making the plans largely ineffective.
32
 
The 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act created the Nonpoint 
Source Management Program, authorizing the EPA to provide grants to 
states implementing programs to reduce nonpoint source pollution in 
                                                          
 27.  Clean Water Act, Section 319, establishes the federal nonpoint water pollution program.  
33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2006).  The program requires states to report on nonpoint source pollution, and 
those states that comply with the reporting requirement then become eligible to apply for federal 
grants to implement their nonpoint source management programs.  Id.  These grants to states, 
territories and tribes fund “a wide variety of activities including technical assistance, financial 
assistance, education, training, technology transfer, demonstration projects and monitoring to assess 
the success of specific nonpoint source implementation projects.”  Clean Water Act Section 319, 
U.S. E.P.A., http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/cwact.cfm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
 28.  Nat’l Research Council Comm., supra note 23, at 7.  “The Clean Water Act specifically 
exempts agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture from being 
regulated as point source discharges and does not address agricultural nonpoint source pollution 
except as it leaves all nonpoint source pollution management to the states . . . .  Id. 
 29.  Agricultural Nonpoint Source Fact Sheet, U.S. E.P.A., 
http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/agriculture_facts.cfm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).  Section 319 
Clean Water Act grants, cost-share, technical assistance, and other economic incentives are available 
for farms.  Id.  
 30.  Chelsea H. Congdon et al., Economic Incentives and Nonpoint Source Pollution: A Case 
Study of California’s Grassland Regions, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 215, 221 
(2008).  
 31.  Id. at 220.  
 32.  Id. 
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navigable waterways.
33
  To receive funding, states must identify 
waterways that require a reduction in nonpoint source pollution to 
achieve and maintain water quality; identify categories of significant 
nonpoint source pollutants; outline the process for identifying Best 
Management Practices (BMPs); and identify state and local programs for 
addressing nonpoint source pollution.
34
  BMPs require farmers to adopt 
specific technology or management practices to decrease runoff 
pollution.
35
  “These BMPs are, of necessity, less specific than 
technology-based requirements for point sources and are intended to 
allow for site-specific adaptation.”
36
  However, BMPs tend to be too 
general to impose accountability on pollutant dischargers and only 
require dischargers to comply with the BMPs, regardless of whether 
more efficient methods of pollution exist.
37
 
Additionally, the Clean Water Act requires states to establish Total 
Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs).  TMDLs set the amount of pollution 
that can be discharged into a specific waterbody in order to attain water 
quality.
38
  For each body of water that does not meet water quality 
standards, nonpoint sources must be factored into the TMDL 
calculations.
39
  However, the federal law still has not taken the next step 
to require states to implement the nonpoint source program, nor does it 
authorize the EPA to step in and promulgate a federal program in the 
absence of an effective state nonpoint source program.
40
 
B. Range of Solutions to Water Pollution from Agriculture 
Proposals to address the problem of excessive water pollution from 
agriculture can be better understood against the backdrop of existing law.  
The range of plausible solutions include creating regulations that require 
farms to implement BMPs, funding to pay for BMPs on farms causing 
water quality impacts, and encouraging water quality trading between 
point sources and farms.  The EPA, states, and regulated point sources 
are calling for greater use of water quality trading, allowing regulated 
                                                          
 33.  33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)–(i) (2006). 
 34.  § 1329(h), (a)(1). 
 35.  Congdon et al., supra note 30, at 227. 
 36.  Id. at 255. 
 37.  Id. at 227, 255. 
 38.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(c) (2006). 
 39.  Congdon et al., supra note 30, at 220. 
 40.  Id. at 221. 
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point sources to purchase less expensive reductions in nutrients and 
sediments from farms in order to bridge the regulatory gap Congress 
created with the Clean Water Act.  Assessing the range of plausible 
solutions explains the support for this particular solution. 
Much scholarship has centered on this debate over how to control 
agricultural nonpoint sources of water pollution.  Most scholars 
recognize that the Clean Water Act’s current regulatory framework is 
inadequate to control nonpoint source pollution.
41
  They disagree, 
however, about whether the best method would be to continue a system 
based on local and voluntary efforts or to initiate a federal and more 
prescriptive approach. 
Some scholars argue that states are better suited to address nonpoint 
sources because land use regulation belongs exclusively to state and local 
governments.
42
  Furthermore, variations in crops, soil, climate, 
topography, hydrology, and other conditions may preclude a national 
one-size-fits-all approach.
43
  As such, proponents of state-level nonpoint 
source management find voluntary, incentive-based programs more 
flexible, efficient, and cost-effective and, thus, more amenable to the 
diverse needs of farmers.
44
 
Local or state-based methods of pollution control include after-the-
fact litigation and preventive measures, like local land use controls.  
Pollution-related litigation frequently involves common law nuisance 
claims and the public trust doctrine.  Public nuisance claims may arise 
                                                          
 41.  See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Agriculture and Water Quality: A Climate-Integrated 
Perspective, 37 VT. L. REV. 847, 847 (2013) (“While control programs have resulted in success 
stories for some kinds of impacts on a local or even regional scale, from a broad national perspective 
the effects of agriculture on water quality have not changed significantly.”); Jan G. Laitos & Heidi 
Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of Agricultural Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033, 
1040 (2013) (“Continued high pollution levels from agricultural sources reflect the states’ failure 
[under the Clean Water Act’s state management programs] to effectively regulate agricultural 
nonpoint source . . . pollution.”); Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls 
Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 25 (2002) (“The increased attention given to controlling nonpoint source 
pollution [under the Clean Water Act and other federal and state programs] has not yet . . . translated 
into either widespread demonstrable results or clearly defined, coherent regulatory programs.”). 
 42.  See Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National?  The Increasing Federalization of Nonpoint 
Source Pollution Regulation,  15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 179, 182 (2000) (noting that “[o]pponents of 
increased federal regulation to protect the environment have recently challenged the constitutionality 
of federal environmental enforcement that they perceive as reaching ‘too far’ into local land use 
affairs”). 
 43.  Adler, supra note 41, at 848. 
 44.  See Congdon et al., supra note 30, at 217 (noting that a regulatory program that requires 
farmers to adopt best management practices and apply for individual permits would be difficult to 
apply to “a highly diverse group of individual farms”). 
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when agricultural activities unreasonably interfere with the use and 
enjoyment of one’s property.
45
  Nonpoint source pollution that impairs 
water quality and adversely affects human health and the property rights 
of others “may be abatable under state nuisance laws.”
46
  The public trust 
doctrine provides that the state has a legal duty to hold navigable waters 
in trust for the benefit of the public and may allow injured parties to 
bring suit against the state for failing to control nonpoint source pollution 
of those waters.
47
  A litigation approach, however, is by its nature piece 
meal, after-the-fact, and relies on the existence of litigants with standing 
and the resources to protect a common pool resource like shared waters.  
In short, it serves a different purpose than a more forward looking 
regulatory or even market approach. 
Preventative measures, like local land use controls, cluster zoning 
and transferable development rights, may also reduce the harmful effects 
of nonpoint source pollution by directing agricultural pollution away 
from waterways and other environmentally sensitive areas.
48
  However, 
lack of consistency between local governments undermines the 
effectiveness of land use controls to address chronic and widespread 
agricultural nonpoint pollution.  Where there is no state standard, local 
controls vary too much to adequately address the scale of nonpoint 
source agricultural pollution, which follows watershed and not political 
boundaries. 
On a larger scale, agricultural nonpoint source pollution may be 
addressed through stronger federal regulation.  Many scholars argue that 
the federal government relies too heavily on voluntary participation
49
 and 
should take a more active role in establishing water quality standards and 
enforcing state compliance.
50
  Proponents of a federal control program 
contend that the technology for addressing nonpoint source pollution is 
available, but that policy concerns—e.g., the protection of agricultural 
interests—are preventing a strong federal response.
51
 
                                                          
 45.  Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 41, at 1066–67. 
 46.  Id.  Note, however, the limits imposed by many states that have “Right to Farm” laws 
protecting farms against these types of lawsuits. 
 47.  Véronique Jarrell-King, Wildlife, Water Quality, and the Public Trust Doctrine: A Means 
of Enforcing Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution Management Plans, 23 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4, 
23 (2012). 
 48.  Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 41, at 1067–69. 
 49.  E.g., Williams, supra note 41, at 27. 
 50.  See id. at 112–13 (arguing for minimum national water quality and monitoring standards, a 
stronger TMDL program, and the elimination of the Clean Water Act’s exemptions for agriculture). 
 51.  Adler, supra note 41, at 871. 
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Suggestions for federal regulatory improvements include creating 





 strengthening the TMDL program,
54
 eliminating the 
Clean Water Act’s agricultural exemption,
55
 and extending the Clean 
Water Act’s citizen suit provision to nonpoint sources that violate state 
water quality standards.
56
  However, there is significant pressure from 
the Farm Bureau and their supporters to avoid any form of federal water 
pollution regulation.
57
  As a result, none of these regulatory reforms have 
gained traction over the years. 
Additionally, agricultural pollution could be addressed through more 
robust and targeted incentive programs.  Dating back to early farm bills, 
farm participation in such voluntary programs has been incentivized 
through income or price support and payments for specific actions.
58
  
The USDA has established programs that pay farmers to implement 
conservation practices, such as the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP), Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP), and 
Conservation Security Program (CSP).
59
  However, not all farms 
contribute equally to the problem of polluted runoff so “[b]asing 
conservation and land use decisions across a watershed primarily on 
incentive-based payments to enlist voluntary actions does not ensure 
efficient use of resources designed to reduce nutrient and sediment 
loadings.”
60
  The National Research Council also recommends targeting 
these programs to fund farms undertaking BMPs in areas with higher 
pollutant loading into waterways.
61
  Other scientific research similarly 
                                                          
 52.  Williams, supra note 41, at 112–15.  
 53.  Congdon et al., supra note 30, at 255. 
 54.  Williams, supra note 41, at 115–18. 
 55.  Id. at 119–20.  The Clean Water Act explicitly exempts “return flows from irrigated 
agriculture” from the federal permitting system.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1) (2006). 
 56.  Craig, supra note 42, at 232. 
 57.  The Farm Bureau’s statement about the “importance to the agricultural community” of its 
lawsuit challenging the TMDL for the Chesapeake Bay exemplifies this broad opposition: “To 
ensure that EPA cannot dictate how and when states choose to implement water quality goals, 
particularly where achieving those goals involves important land use and economic decisions.”  AM. 
FARM BUREAU FED’N, http://www.fb.org/index.php?fuseaction=legal.active (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014).  
 58.  Nat’l Research Council Comm., supra note 23, at 166.   
 59.   See id. at 9 (“The EPA could assist the USDA to help improve the targeting of funds 
expended in the CRP, EQIP, and CSP.”).  
 60.  Id. at 178. 
 61.  Id. at 8, 168–72, 188.  Although EQIP is implemented by local conservation districts, it 
“does not effectively target working lands that produce the highest rates of nutrient and sediment 
pollutant loads.” Id. at 169.  CSP rewards farmers who install water quality and erosion control 
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finds that an approach that targets efforts on the most highly phosphorus-
polluting fields and aggregates efforts within certain watersheds is the 




A targeted approach requires stronger interagency coordination 
between the USDA and the EPA to direct these funds and work with 
conservation districts, extension agents, and farmers on water quality 
management and monitoring.
63
  From a water quality perspective, it 
makes very little sense to have conservation programs that cannot be 
targeted based on proximity to water bodies.  The National Research 
Council recommends that current USDA “programs aimed at reducing 
nutrient and sediment inputs should include efforts at targeting areas of 
higher nutrient and sediment deliveries to surface water.”
64
  However, 
some farm advocates oppose targeting funding in this way, and describe 
it as “unfair” because it excludes some producers from being able to 
receive conservation payments.
65
  In order to advance this strategy, 
agencies would need to overcome this political pressure, which has so far 
stymied meaningful progress in this area.
66
 
C. The EPA’s Chosen Solution—Market Mechanism 
Lastly, there is the market mechanism to address unregulated water 
pollution from farms.  As noted, the EPA has concluded that “pollution 
sources not traditionally regulated, most notably non-point pollutants 
from agriculture, are the primary source of water quality impairment in 
many watersheds.”
67
  The EPA accepts the lack of agricultural regulation 
as the status quo, and asserts that water quality trading provides a 
“framework wherein pollutants can be voluntarily reduced by non-point 
sources more cost-effectively than imposing additional treatment 
controls on point sources.”
68
 
                                                          
BMPs by increasing payments, but it is “operated with only a modest budget.”  Id. at 170. 
 62.  Matthew W. Diebel et. al., Landscape Planning for Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution 
Reduction I: A Geographical Allocation Framework, 42 ENVTL. MGMT. 789, 798–800 (2008). 
 63.  Nat’l Research Council Comm., supra note 23, at 171–72. 
 64.  Id. at 188 (emphasis in original removed). 
 65.  Id. at 178. 
 66.  The National Research Council recognizes that targeting of USDA financial incentive 
programs has been stymied by political pressure; targeting is seen as “unfair” because it excludes 
some producers from being able to receive conservation payments. Id. 
 67.  Water Quality Trading Evaluation, supra note 11, at ES-1. 
 68.  Id.; see also id. at 1-1.  
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In environmental law and policy, there is an ongoing debate about 
whether the tool of command and control regulation is preferable to the 
market mechanism.
69
  For the purposes of this Article, I provide a brief 
explanation and examples without repeating the critiques of these 
divergent approaches replete in the literature.
70
 
Command and control regulations, which are prescriptive, take a 
uniform approach and require all members of a particular industrial or 
municipal category to reduce pollution.  An example of this is the Clean 
Water Act’s use of technology-based standards for a particular industry, 
which sets clear end-of-pipe discharge limits to be included in permits in 




By contrast, the common example of a market mechanism is 
emission trading under the Clean Air Act: 
Emissions trading schemes allocate pollution rights within an industrial 
sector or geographic region based on the theory that firms that can 
reduce their emissions at a lower cost will be encouraged to do so by a 
market mechanism in which they can sell their excess allocation to 
firms for which such reductions would be more expensive.  This 
presumably accomplishes the ultimate regulatory goal (which 
government still establishes) in the most efficient way.
72
 
Because market mechanisms have been developed mainly as an 
alternative to uniform prescriptive regulation across an entire regulated 
industry, it is often pitted against regulations or presented as an “either 
or” scenario.  The use of the market mechanism to reduce unregulated 
agricultural nonpoint source pollution falls somewhat outside the 
boundaries of the debate.
73
 
The market mechanism is most commonly described in this context 
as allowing point sources of pollution to buy credits from agricultural 
nonpoint sources that have reduced pollution.
74
  Water quality trading 
                                                          
 69.  Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 
814–21 (2005). 
 70.  See, e.g., Adler, supra note 41; Laitos & Ruckreigle, supra note 41; Williams, supra note 
41; Craig, supra note 42; Congdon et al., supra note 30; Jarrell-King, supra note 47. 
 71.  Clean Water Act, U.S. E.P.A., http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/cwa.cfm?program_id =45.  
 72.  Freeman & Farber, supra note 69, at 814. 
 73.  Id. at 816.  Although Freeman and Farber cite watershed-based effluent trading as an 
example of a market mechanism, it is important to tease out this distinction about trading with 
unregulated nonpoint sources a bit more. 
 74.  Other market mechanisms for agricultural pollution, which are less widely discussed, are 
issuing traditional permits to agriculture and then using a cap and trade system between farms, or 
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between point and agricultural nonpoint sources occurs as a response to a 
regulatory driver, not as an alternative.  It is a tool to control what are 
currently unregulated discharges of pollution from agriculture.  For 
example, a state sets a prescriptive standard for phosphorus and a 
municipal wastewater treatment plant looks for a way to meet the new 
regulation.  Finding a low cost way of complying with the new 
regulation creates the impetus for the point source to seek out an 
unregulated agricultural source with which it can enter a contract to 
secure reductions in phosphorus. 
Additionally, the benefits for the environment may extend beyond 
reductions in the traded pollutant. 
[E]ven if phosphorus is the regulated target, installing Best 
Management Practices (BMPs) on a farm or in a subdivision reduce 
other pollutants as well, such as Total Suspended Solids that carry 
phosphorus in addition to petroleum residues and silt up streams. BMPs 
can prevent erosion, restore habitat, and sequester carbon.
75
 
One place where the EPA is encouraging trading between point and 
nonpoint sources is in watershed clean-up plans or TMDLs.
76
  A TMDL 
calculates the total amount of a pollutant a water body can receive and 
meet water quality standards.
77
  As noted, this calculation includes load 
allocations from nonpoint and background sources and waste load 
allocations from point sources.
78
 
However, trading between point and nonpoint sources in a TMDL 
setting is not squarely addressed in the Clean Water Act or related 
regulations.  There is a vague recognition in the TMDL regulations that 
the “TMDL process provides for nonpoint source control tradeoffs.”
79
  
                                                          
imposing effluent fees.  Congdon et al., supra note 30, at 259–60. 
 75.  Frank & Goswami, supra note 17, at 3; see also Water Quality Trading Evaluation, supra 
note 11, at ES-1. 
 76.  What is a TMDL?, U.S. E.P.A., http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/ 
overviewoftmdl.cfm (last updated Mar. 11, 2013). 
 77.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)C) (2006) (“(C) Each State shall establish for the waters identified 
in paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, and in accordance with the priority ranking, the total 
maximum daily load, for those pollutants which the Administrator identifies under section 
1314(a)(2) of this title as suitable for such calculation. Such load shall be established at a level 
necessary to implement the applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin 
of safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between 
effluent limitations and water quality.”). 
 78. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(g)–(h) (2014).  
 79.  40 C.F.R. § 130.2(g)–(i) (2014) (“(g) Load allocation (LA). The portion of a receiving 
water’s loading capacity that is attributed either to one of its existing or future nonpoint sources of 
pollution or to natural background sources. Load allocations are best estimates of the loading, which 
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One vein of thinking is that if a point source is going to “continue 
activities that give rise to pollutant loading, they must secure reductions 
from nonpoint sources in the watershed by paying the nonpoint sources 
to reduce their pollutant loading.”
80
  Courts are divided as to the legality 
of offsetting pollution sources.
81
 
Despite the legal uncertainties, the EPA appears to present trading as 
the plausible solution to the problem of chronic unregulated agricultural 
runoff; it continues to emphasize water quality trading between point and 
nonpoint sources by encouraging incorporation of trading into TMDLs.
82
  
The 2003 EPA Trading Policy goes beyond the gaps in its regulations 
and “encourages the inclusion of specific trading provisions in the 
TMDL” as well as in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
permits and watershed plans.
83
  This policy is particularly applicable to 
chronic problems with agricultural runoff because nutrients and 
sediments are the primary pollutants the EPA Trading Policy targets.
84
  
Hence, the market mechanism could be a plausible tool to bring under 
control pollution sources that Congress has been unwilling to regulate 
using prescriptive requirements or targeted financial incentives. 
Yet, there are multiple caveats and complicating factors to this 
                                                          
may range from reasonably accurate estimates to gross allotments, depending on the availability of 
data and appropriate techniques for predicting the loading. Wherever possible, natural and nonpoint 
source loads should be distinguished.” (h) Wasteload allocation (WLA). The portion of a receiving 
water’s loading capacity that is allocated to one of its existing or future point sources of pollution. 
WLAs constitute a type of water quality-based effluent limitation. (i) Total maximum daily load 
(TMDL). The sum of the individual WLAs for point sources and LAs for nonpoint sources and 
natural background. If a receiving water has only one point source discharger, the TMDL is the sum 
of that point source WLA plus the LAs for any nonpoint sources of pollution and natural background 
sources, tributaries, or adjacent segments. TMDLs can be expressed in terms of either mass per time, 
toxicity, or other appropriate measure. If Best Management Practices (BMPs) or other nonpoint 
source pollution controls make more stringent load allocations practicable, then wasteload 
allocations can be made less stringent. Thus, the TMDL process provides for nonpoint source control 
tradeoffs.” (emphasis added)). 
 80.  Thomas K. Ruppert, Water Quality Trading and Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution: 
An Analysis of the Effectiveness and Fairness of EPA’s Policy on Water Quality Trading, 15 VILL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9–10 (2004). 
 81. The EPA lacks clear statutory authority to allow water quality trading. Showalter & 
Spigener, supra note 14, at 7–10; Friends of Pinto Creek v. EPA, 504 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 
2007) (finding that 44 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) “is very clear that no permit may be issued to a new 
discharger if the discharge will contribute to the violation of water quality standards” and ultimately 
rejecting offsetting); cf.  In re City of Annandale, 731 N.W. 2d 502 (Minn. 2007) (allowing state 
agency to consider offsets from other pollution sources while deciding whether to issue discharges 
from a new source would result in a violation of water quality standards). 
 82.  See U.S. EPA, supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 83.  EPA Water Quality Trading Policy, Issuance of Final Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 1608-01, 1610 
(Jan. 13, 2003). 
 84.  Id. at 1610. 
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proposition.  In addition to the absence of clear statutory authority, the 
market mechanism cannot succeed without prescriptive regulations in 
some part of the system.  It is precisely the prescription that drives the 
market for regulated point sources to trade with unregulated nonpoint 
sources of pollution.
85
  The prescription goes hand in hand with the 
market mechanism rather than an alternative to a command and control 
system.  At present that is dependent on states creating stringent nutrient 
standards or TMDLs for specific waterbodies so trading will be 
piecemeal in application.  Furthermore, it is technically more difficult to 
measure runoff from a farm than emissions from a smokestack or 
discharges from a wastewater treatment plant.
86
  This creates difficulties 
in accurately establishing tradable credits, verifying actual reductions as 
opposed to modeled ones, and knowing when the market tool is 
succeeding or failing. 
So although plausible, the jury is out on whether the market 
mechanism of trading nonpoint for point source pollution will truly solve 
the problem of sediments and nutrients fouling the nation’s waters.  
Assuming trading and offsets are permissible under the Clean Water Act, 
how the market mechanism is implemented will influence whether this 
approach results in measurable environmental improvements.  Since 
watershed trading has generated more talk than actual trades, the tool is 
still largely experimental.  Approaching watershed-based trading with an 
experimental mindset, like that envisioned by adaptive management 
theory, should improve the likelihood of measurable environmental 
improvements or provide enough information to change course if it is not 
delivering on the promise of cleaner water. 
II. ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: MAGIC WORDS 
The EPA and states have used the term “adaptive management” in 
conjunction with water quality trading programs in the United States, but 
they tend to lack specificity about how to apply the theory.  Adaptive 
management holds the potential to create real improvements in water 
quality based on experimenting and incorporating new information.  
                                                          
 85.  James Salzmann & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 617–20 (2000). 
 86.  Showalter & Spigener, supra note 14; see also Diebel et. al., supra note 62, at 800 
(summing it up: “The use of agricultural conservation practices has no doubt benefited the 
environment.  However, much environmental degradation is still caused by agriculture, and the 
benefits of conservation have been difficult to measure”). 
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However, without measurable improvement to water quality, adaptive 
management becomes magic words that give the illusion of positive 
action.  In this section, I highlight key examples where adaptive 
management and water quality trading are appearing together: 
Chesapeake Bay, Ohio River, Wisconsin (impacting waters that empty 
into the Great Lakes and Mississippi River), Rogue River, Willamette 
River, and Lower Boise River. 
Adaptive management is an approach by which natural resource 
agencies are encouraged to learn as they implement their programs; the 
aim being to create feedback loops that allow programs to learn and 
come closer to achieving their goals by routinely incorporating new 
information.
87
  Pioneered in the context of dynamic ecosystems in the 
1970s, adaptive management emphasizes that dynamic systems are better 
served by management that collects, tests, and applies information. 
Although there are a variety of descriptions of adaptive management 
theory and practice, one scholar has attempted to provide four core 
principles of adaptive management: 
(1) treating present ecological models, understandings, and the 
management interventions predicated upon them as provisional; (2) 
designing interventions as testable hypotheses where possible; (3) 
carefully and systematically monitoring and evaluating the results; and 
(4) adjusting models, understandings, and management interventions in 
accord with this new learning.
88
 
At its core, adaptive management anticipates that agencies—either 
alone or in conjunction with stakeholders—actively seek new 
information and modify their management approaches in light of that 
new information.
89
  With this brief explanation of adaptive management 
in mind, the following examples illustrate where adaptive management 
and water quality trading are appearing together. 
The largest estuary in the United States, the Chesapeake Bay, has 
been at the center of watershed clean-up efforts, including adaptive 
management and trading.
90
  The Chesapeake Bay TMDL includes a 
section entitled “Implementation and Adaptive Management.”  This 
                                                          
 87.  Melissa K. Scanlan & Stephanie Tai, Marginalized Monitoring: Adaptively Managing 
Urban Stormwater, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 7–16 (2013). 
 88.  Id. at 9–10 (citing Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information 
Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1443 (2008)). 
 89.  Id. at 10. 
 90.  Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. E.P.A., No 1:1–CV–0067, 2013 WL 5177530, at *5–9 
(M.D. Penn. Sept. 13, 2013). 
  
988 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
section describes offsets and trading anticipated by the TMDL, but does 
not detail the adaptive management approach indicated by the title of the 
section.
91
  In one subsection addressing climate, the EPA commits itself 
“to take an adaptive management approach to the Bay TMDL and 
incorporate new scientific understanding of the effects of climate change 
into the Bay TMDL, in this case during the mid-course assessment.”
92
  
However, the details of how this should be implemented are left 
undeveloped.  Furthermore, there is no indication in the TMDL and its 
appendix on offsets and trading that an adaptive management iterative 
process will be used.  The TMDL does not require any water quality 
monitoring to inform adjustments in individual trades or offsets, assess a 
bundle of trades on one segment of the watershed, or review the program 
as a whole.
93
  By not requiring water quality monitoring in the TMDL 
and the accompanying appendix, the EPA has not used these tools to 
provide for uniform data collection to assess progress and provide 
feedback that informs possible land management changes.  Taken 
together, the use of the term “adaptive management” in relation to 
trading in the Chesapeake Bay TMDL carries very little substantive 
meaning. 
The Ohio River Basin is the subject of a pilot water quality trading 
program focused on agricultural nonpoint sources generating credits to 
trade with point sources.
94
  The Ohio River pilot’s use of adaptive 
management terminology is, like the Chesapeake Bay TMDL, devoid of 
clear steps laying out an experimental design and a continuous learning 
process for water managers.  Like the Chesapeake Bay TMDL, this 
trading plan also offers little detail on implementing adaptive 
management.  In its entirety the section addressing adaptive management 
reads: “An adaptive management approach will be used to periodically 
review and, if necessary, amend this Plan during the Pilot to achieve 
optimum effectiveness, efficiency, and environmental improvement.  
                                                          
 91.  U.S. E.P.A., CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR NITROGEN, 
PHOSPHOROUS AND SEDIMENT §§ 10, 10.1.2, 10.2, 10.5 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/tmdl/ChesapeakeBay/tmdlexec.html. 
 92.  Id. §10.5. 
 93.  Id. §§ 10.1.2, 10.2; app. S (Offsetting New or Increased Loadings of Nitrogen, Phosphorus, 
and Sediment to the Chesapeake Bay Watershed).  The EPA describes that it reserves the authority 
to review individual offsets, but expects its role to primarily be one of reviewing offsets at the 
broader programmatic level.  Id. § 10.1.4.  
 94.  ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., PILOT TRADING PLAN 1.0 FOR THE OHIO RIVER BASIN 
INTERSTATE WATER QUALITY TRADING PROJECT (2011), available at www.farmland.org/documents 
/ORBTradingPlan8-6-12V2FINAL.pdf. 
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Moreover, the Ohio River pilot aims to create a trading program in 
which nonpoint sources will generate credits to sell point sources.
96
  
Credits will be generated by a “scientifically-based” method of 
determining “ecologically-appropriate trade ratios.”
97
  Yet, the method is 
devoid of any monitoring of water quality.  Instead, it relies entirely on 
two models, one to estimate nutrient reductions at the edge of the field 
where a BMP has been installed and another to estimate nutrient 
attenuation (reduction) from the edge-of-field to the point where the 
credits will be used.
98
  The plan establishes a credit reserve in case of 
credit uncertainty or “failure,”
99
 but verification of BMP installation and 
functioning does not include a requirement to monitor water quality.
100
 
In Wisconsin, the phosphorus water quality standards for the state’s 
more than 15,000 lakes and 80,000 miles of streams and rivers
101
 include 
references to trading and adaptive management.  However, the standards 
present trading and adaptive management as two different “compliance 
options.”
102
  The state agency guidance on the phosphorus rules describes 
these options as compliance options that give point sources “flexibility to 
achieve a phosphorus water quality based effluent limit (WQBEL) by 
controlling point and nonpoint phosphorus sources . . . .”
103
  The 
guidance advises that a permittee may want to consider the adaptive 
management option when: 
 
1. The WQBEL is stringent (generally 0.4 mg/L or less). 
2. Achieving compliance would result in major facility modification 
even with the facility functioning at optimal conditions.  If major 
facility modification is not required the applicant is not eligible for 
adaptive management. 
3. Reducing nonpoint or other point sources is economically 
                                                          
 95.  Id. at 9.  
 96.  Id. at 4–6.  
 97.  Id. at 4. 
 98.  Id. at 5–6.  The field model is the EPA region 5’s spreadsheet model, and the attenuation 
model is WARMF.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 8–9.  
 100.  Id. at E-7.  
 101.  WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES, 2010 WISCONSIN WATER QUALITY REPORT TO CONGRESS 
(2010), available at http://www.loonlakedistrict.org/pages/Attachment_A_2010_WQ_RptTo 
Congress_FINAL _3-30-2010.pdf, at 12.   
 102. Wisconsin’s Adaptive Management, WIS. DEPARTMENT OF NAT. RESOURCES, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/SurfaceWater/adaptive management.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).   
 103.  Id. at 6.  
  





Wisconsin is not applying adaptive management to water quality 
trading, but presenting adaptive management as a less-stringent-than-
trading compliance option.
105
  Wisconsin offers an “adaptive 
management option” that allows an extended fifteen-year compliance 
schedule to point sources for meeting phosphorus WQBELs.
106
  
Wisconsin’s guidance for a phosphorus adaptive management plan says 
it should include: 
 
1. The amount of phosphorus that will be accounted for through 
adaptive management[,] 
2. How the applicant will achieve compliance with interim and final 
WQBEL, 
3. What strategies will be used to control the phosphorus contributions, 
and 
4. Other implementation details including, but not limited to, 





The plan can even allow applicants to pursue reductions in 
phosphorus by other sources that are not upstream of the point source.
108
  
There are no explicit water quality data collection requirements related to 
activities to reduce phosphorus by nonpoint sources in the adaptive 
management guidance.
109
  Although there is indication that the point 
source will ultimately need to meet water quality at the discharge point, 
there is an allowance to use modeling to show “compliance with the 
intent of adaptive management” when actual water quality compliance is 
“infeasible.”
110
  Unlike the prior two examples, which simply lacked 
                                                          
 104.  Id. at 85.  
 105.  WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT TECHNICAL HANDBOOK: A 
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT FOR STAKEHOLDERS, Table 1, at 17 (Jan. 7, 2013), available at  
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/surfacewater/documents/AdaptiveManagementHandbooksigned.pdf. 
 106.  Id. at 86–88 (“WQBELs will be documented in the permit but will be held in abeyance 
pending the implementation of the adaptive management plan . . . .  In other words, the WQBEL is 
included in the permit, but compliance is not required until the third permit term of the adaptive 
management plan or the water quality criteria has been attained, whichever comes first.”). 
 107.  Id. at 91.  
 108.  Id. 
 109.  The guidance includes water monitoring requirements at the point source and holds open 
the option of monitoring based on “plan requirements,” but there are no specific requirements to 
monitor nonpoint or other sources that the permittee has solicited to make reductions under its 
adaptive management plan. Id. at 99–100. 
 110.  Id. at 95 (“However, in some instances the contributions from other sources or the legacy 
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detail, this built-in compliance delay in Wisconsin’s approach may 
thwart water quality improvements.
111
 
The Rogue River Basin Water Quality Management Plan, which 
provides strategies for implementing the TMDL for that basin in Oregon, 
provides an approach that comes closer to the purpose of adaptive 
management.
112
  The Rogue River TMDL encourages the use of trading 
thermal discharges.
113
  Its section on adaptive management is instructive.  
It explicitly recognizes that TMDLs are based on models that are 
oversimplifications of complex processes and unlikely to exactly predict 
how waterbodies will respond to management practices.
114
  Similarly, it 
acknowledges that technology for controlling nonpoint source pollution 
is in the development stages and that floods, drought, and other events 
may impair the expected functioning of BMPs.
115
 
Oregon outlines expectations for adaptive management in this Water 
Quality Management Plan including a five-year review of TMDL 
implementation progress by the state agency, which involves assessing 
water quality standards; where implementation is inadequate, Oregon 
specifies that they should revise the plan to address the inadequacies.
116
  
By creating this simple iterative process, the plan provides a means for 
the agency to engage in learning and incorporate new information into 
their water management. 
In another part of Oregon, the Willamette River Basin TMDL 
improves upon this articulated adaptive management process by 
specifying that it will have a plan for monitoring, data collection, data 
                                                          
phosphorus in the receiving water makes achieving compliance with the criteria infeasible at the 
point of discharge within two permit terms.  In these instances the applicant may use modeling to 
show compliance with the intent of adaptive management.  In this case, model results/data should 
illustrate that water quality criteria would be attained if the residual phosphorus in the waterbody 
were removed.”).  See also id. at 97 (“Modeling may also be used to illustrate the effectiveness of 
the phosphorus reduction strategy and to illustrate compliance with the adaptive management 
plan.”). 
 111.  John Kennedy, Green Bay Metropolitan Sewerage District, powerpoint, Water Quality 
Trading: A Permitee’s Perspective, at slide 18 (Nov. 14, 2011) (“Adaptive Management: 
Compliance Schedules (may get more time for ultimate compliance, but subject to DNR approval at 
each permit renewal.  Trading – may offer incremental removal credits to avoid large capital 
expense.”).   
 112.  OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, ROGUE RIVER BASIN TMDL, ch. 4, figure 4.2, at 4-2 
(2008), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/tmdls/docs/roguebasin/Rogue/Chapter4WQMP 
.pdf. 
 113.  Id. at 4-14.  
 114.  Id. at 4-2.  
 115.  Id. at 4-2, 4-3.  
 116.  Id. at 4-3. 
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assessment, and making responsive revisions.  If water quality standards 




Idaho’s Lower Boise River’s Implementation Plan for total 
phosphorus, which is described as “adaptive management,” offers 
another template for creating an adaptive management approach.  Plan 
developers explain that “the implementation schedule is designed to be 
flexible within an adaptive management framework. . . .  The concept of 
adaptive management allows for on-the-ground implementation to 
proceed where uncertainty exists about how and when reduction targets 
will be met.”
118
  The plan emphasizes that “focused monitoring” is 
important for adaptive management, and that they are “committed to 
monitoring” specific reaches of the Lower Boise River to assess 
beneficial uses and phosphorus loading.
119
  The plan calls for monitoring 
“at the mouth of key tributaries” to assess “how well nonpoint source 
improvements are performing.”
120
  It similarly requires monitoring of 




The pollutant trading section of the Boise plan includes even more 
specific details about monitoring necessary for adaptive management.  
The plan says: “A rigorous monitoring plan and schedule is critical [to 
the TMDL].  There is no way to determine progress, define trends, fill 
data gaps or enlarge understanding without an understanding of the 
changes occurring in the system.”
122
 
As it relates to use of BMPs to reduce nonpoint source pollution, the 
Idaho plan states: 
BMP-specific monitoring will be included as part of specific treatment 
projects to verify that the BMPs are properly installed, maintained, and 
working as designed.  Source groups constructing BMP projects should 
include budget allowances for a monitoring program.  The results of the 
monitoring program will be used to recommend or discourage similar 
                                                          
 117.  Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, WILLAMETTE BASIN TMDL, 14–20 (2006), available at 
http://www.deq.idaho.gov/media/451497-_water_data_reports_surface_water_tmdls_boise_river_ 
lower_lbr_total_phosphorus_plan_final.pdf .  This TMDL also encourages trading for temperature.  
Id. at 14-34. 
 118.  Id. at xxii. 
 119.  Id. at xxiii.  
 120.  Id.   
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Id. at 54. 
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projects in the future.
123
 
Some agricultural BMPs will have a “quantitative monitoring component 




These examples show that the EPA and some states are interested in 
applying adaptive management to trading, as gauged by the use of both 
terms in emerging water restoration efforts.  However, references to 
adaptive management are infrequently accompanied by guidance about 
how to structure an experimental approach.  Oregon and Idaho’s policies 
can be used as scaffolding for creating an adaptive management 
approach to trading that generates needed information.  If the adaptive 
management approaches reflected current scientific advancements, data 
could be used to inform about the establishment of the trades, changes in 
management, modifications of permits or contracts, or assessments of 
whole water clean-up plans.  The next section will explore some options 
for making water quality trading more adaptive. 
III. ADAPTIVE TRADING: EXPERIMENTATION 
The iterative monitoring and adjusting behavior core of the adaptive 
management approach appears to conflict with a prescriptive “command 
and control” system of regulations.
125
  Some scholars also present an 
adaptive management approach to environmental problems as a counter 
to a market approach.
126
  However, due to the flexibility of the market 
                                                          
 123.  Id. at 55. 
 124.  Id. at 56. 
 125.  Diebel et al., supra note 62, at 799–800.  The command and control approach refers to the 
traditional method of controlling pollution through direct regulation. Winston Harrington & Richard 
D. Morgenstern, Economic Incentive versus Command and Control: What’s the Best Approach for 
Solving Environmental Problems? 152 RESOURCES 13 (2004). 
 126.  In response to the needs presented by climate disruption, Professor Dellapenna presents 
these as opposing approaches:  
Gene Stakhiv argues for adaptive management rather than an anticipatory strategy.  By this, 
Stakhiv means that we should apply existing legal regimes with little or no change, 
counting on the flexibility he assumes is already built into such regimes to adapt gradually 
to the pressures induced by a combination of population growth, climate change, and 
technological innovation.  Stakhiv argues against major changes in legal regimes to 
anticipate climate disruptions when the extent (and sometimes the precise nature) of the 
disruption is not known for certain.  Others have suggested a turn to markets as a solution to 
adaptation to climate disruption in the face of massive uncertainty.   
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Climate Disruption, the Washington Consensus, and Water Law Reform, 
81 TEMP. L. REV. 383, 389 (2008) (internal citations omitted).   
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mechanism, it may be more amenable to incorporating an adaptive 
approach. 
Additionally, since much is unknown about the efficacy of markets 
to solve intractable water quality problems, use of this policy tool would 
benefit from an experimental frame.  Detractors will argue that 
recommending the application of adaptive management to water quality 
trading programs runs the risk of increasing the transaction costs of 
trading to the point that it negates the potential efficiencies gained by 
trading.  Imposing a heavy information burden on those designing and 
implementing a trading program may increase the cost and discourage 
participation.
127
  The challenge is whether adaptive management can be 
applied in a way that produces reliable information and flexibility to 
respond without increasing transaction costs to such an extent that 
trading partners will not enter the market.  The markets’ reliance on 
robust information raises another question: whether water quality trading 




In water quality trading, an adaptive management approach is 
potentially a useful tool for accounting for credit creation, uncertainty, 
compliance, and assessment of program efficacy.  In an adaptive trading 
framework, monitoring and modeling of nonpoint source reductions and 
water quality improvements would be combined to provide robust 
information to inform these key issues. 
However, the predominant water quality trading approach relies 
heavily on modeling without an additional monitoring follow up.  In this 
section, I start by explaining the information challenges presented by 
using BMPs to reduce agricultural pollution, the use of models and 
monitoring in this context, and the EPA’s Trading Policy on these issues.  
I then posit how adaptive management could be intentionally applied to 
water quality trading to produce adaptive trading. 
When accounting for agricultural runoff, there are difficulties present 
both in measuring reductions in loading or pollutant concentration and 
accurately modeling those reductions.
129
  Variables in soil, topography, 
distance to receiving water, and weather impact how much runoff will be 
                                                          
 127.  Salzmann & Ruhl, supra note 85, at 636 (recognizing the potential burdens posed by 
accounting for nonfungibilities across type, space, and time in environmental trading markets). 
 128.  A lack of information can be a hurdle to robust trading.  “This lack of information about 
the relative costs of pollution reduction often prevents realization of the full theoretical benefits that 
could arise from trading.”  Ruppert, supra note 80, at 12. 
 129. Ruppert, supra note 80, at 12–13. 
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reduced from a BMP.
130
  One approach is to confirm installation of 
BMPs, which according to a model, should yield a specific reduction in 
pollutant loading.  However, simply verifying installation of a BMP does 
not ensure that the expected pollutant loading reductions have occurred.  
Poor construction or heavy rainfall could result in it not functioning as 
estimated and modeled.
131
  Similarly, less than expected rainfall or 
variation in some other environmental variable could mean the field on 
which the BMP was installed is yielding greater than modeled reductions 
in pollutant loading. 
Modeling is fraught with difficulties.  Although modeling allows for 
action in the face of uncertainty and lack of direct monitoring data, the 
results can vary based on adequacy of the data inputs as well as different 
interpretations of results.
132
  Models are also subject to gaming.  By 
slightly altering the many assumed values in equations, a modeler can 
often substantially change the outcome of the model with only minor and 
apparently reasonable changes to the variable assumptions.  The dramatic 
changes in the result of complex equations due to miniscule changes in 




One way to address the myriad of uncertainties is to add a larger 
safety factor to reduce the calculation of loading reductions.  Yet, this 
still does not provide a reliable way of knowing whether pollution 
reductions are actually being made to generate tradable credits.  Another 
approach could be based on monitoring the receiving water body at the 
edge of the field where the individual BMP was used.  However, this too 
may not show measurable improvements in water quality.  Even though 
BMPs have been shown to be effective at reducing sediment and nutrient 
inputs to surface waters, these reductions “have rarely been found to act 
in concert to produce measurable, broad-scale improvements in water 
quality.”
134
  Despite the USDA spending $29.7 billion since 1987 to 
encourage farmers to implement conservation, they have generally not 
                                                          
 130.  Corey Longhurst, Where is the Point? Water Quality Trading’s Inability to Deal with 
Nonpoint Source Agricultural Pollution, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 175, 194 (2012). 
 131.  Showalter & Spigener, supra note 14, at 11 (“A better method would be to require direct 
monitoring at the edge of the property and determine compliance based on actual reductions in 
loading.”).  This author then presumed the feasibility of monitoring was low, but did not cite any 
support for that presumption.   
 132.  Ruppert, supra note 80, at 13. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Diebel et al., supra note 62, at 789.   
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produced measurable improvements in stream water quality.
135
  One 
group of scientists found this is because “pollution control effort is often 
too sparsely distributed across the landscape to make an appreciable 
difference in any one place.”
136
 
According to the National Research Council, “The effectiveness of 
BMPs in agricultural settings is a subject of ongoing study.”
137
  In their 
report focused on the Mississippi River Basin, they highlight the need for 
water quality monitoring of different cropping practices.  They also call 
for Mississippi River system-wide water quality monitoring to evaluate 
the water quality impacts of USDA funding programs for farmers to 
install BMPs.
138
  For instance, for phosphorus BMPs, they note that the 
effectiveness is “difficult to evaluate at the farm field or local watershed 
level.”
139
  Because so much phosphorus is attached to soil particles, there 
is a lag time between changes in soil management and improvements in 
water quality.  The council recognizes that meaningful evaluation of the 
water quality effectiveness of BMPs for phosphorus has been 
confounded by the “limited amount of long-term water quality data . . . 
.”
140
  Likewise, a quantitative assessment of how much sediment is 
coming from a particular field is also challenging.  Soil erosion from 
farming varies based on multiple factors that affect soil erosion, such as 
soil properties, fertilizer applications, slope of the land, location in 
relation to nearby streams, use of irrigation, and crop growth stage.
141
 
The National Research Council’s call for a system-wide monitoring 
effort is reinforced by research on nonpoint source pollution reductions 
in Wisconsin.  The Wisconsin study shows that a targeted and aggregated 
approach is the most efficient way to see measureable improvements in 
water quality.
142
  In other words, a program should target BMP 
installations to the largest sources of pollution and aggregate those 
efforts within watersheds.  This is followed by monitoring to determine 
whether there is a water quality improvement in the receiving water body 
downstream from multiple installations of BMPs.
143
 
                                                          
 135.  Id. at 789–90. 
 136.  Id. at 790. 
 137. Nat’l Research Council Comm., supra note 23, at 171.  
 138.  Id. at 172.  
 139.  Id. at 175. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  The National Research Council states, “It would be impractical to monitor continuously the 
amount of sediments coming off each farm field.”  Id. at 176. 
 142.  Diebel et al., supra note 62, at 789, 798–800. 
 143.  Ruppert, supra note 80, at 16; Diebel et al., supra note 62, at 789.   
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The EPA’s approach to trading embraces modeling and monitoring, 
but leans heavily on modeling, and does not reflect current scientific 
understanding of the need to target and aggregate efforts.  The EPA 
Trading Policy includes several provisions on the topic of whether 
monitoring or modeling should be used for water quality trading.  In the 
EPA Trading Policy’s section on how trading aligns with the Clean 
Water Act, the policy asserts that NPDES permit-required sampling 
protocols and monitoring frequencies “should continue to be used where 
applicable for measuring compliance for point sources that engage in 
trading.”
144
  This is “necessary” to provide clear, consistent compliance 
measurements that provide sufficient information for enforcement.
145
 
The EPA Trading Policy also sets forth “elements of credible trading 
programs.”
146
  The section on quantifying credits is particularly relevant 
to how compliance with the Clean Water Act will be demonstrated 
because if the credits do not accurately reflect reality, compliance will be 
frustrated.
147
  The EPA’s policy supports standard protocols to quantify 
pollutant loads, load reductions, and credits. 
The EPA recognizes the “greater uncertainty” that exists for trades 
with nonpoint sources, and supports a variety of ways to “compensate” 
for this, including monitoring to verify load reductions; trading ratios; 
using performance values to estimate load reductions; and others.
148
  
Despite these different options, including monitoring for agricultural 




For instance, the result of a recent EPA and USDA collaboration is 
the Nitrogen Trading Tool, which is a model aimed at facilitating 
                                                          
 144.  EPA Water Quality Trading Policy, Issuance of Final Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 1608-01, 1611 
(Jan. 13, 2003). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 1611–12. 
 147.  Id. at 1612. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. (“The site-specific procedures and protocols used in water quality trading programs that 
involve agriculture . . . should be developed by states and tribes in consultation with United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) agencies.  Those procedures should estimate nutrient or 
sediment load delivery to the stream segment, water body or watershed where trading occurs.” 
(emphasis added)).  Id. (“[T]he Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE) may be used in 
some locations to estimate the sediment yield at the end of a slope in agricultural settings.  The 
sediment yield at the end of a slope coupled with an appropriate method to estimate sediment 
delivery to the receiving waters can provide a reasonable estimate of sediment load and load 
reductions.” (emphasis added)).  Id. (“EPA and the USDA are working with other agencies to 
evaluate existing methods and to develop improved methods and procedures for estimating loads 
from agricultural . . .” (emphasis added)).   
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trading.  This tool is a web-based interface that allows one to estimate 
nitrogen reductions due to implementing varying agricultural practices.
150
  
The idea is that the tool can be used to identify credits available to be 
traded or banked.
151
  Its creators note that the design structure is generic 
enough that it could be adapted to other pollutants such as phosphorus 
and sediment.
152
  They preface the tool by acknowledging that 




However, this emphasis on estimating and modeling rather than 
monitoring actual results is at odds with another part of the EPA’s 
Trading Policy related to compliance and enforcement.  The compliance 
and enforcement section calls for “clear enforceable mechanisms 
consistent with NPDES regulations that ensure legal accountability for 
the generation of credits that are traded.”
154
  However, estimates of 
pollutant loading do not provide the type of clarity typically used in 
NPDES permit enforcement, such as discharge monitoring reports.  
Estimating, as opposed to actual monitoring, increases the uncertainty 
and legal risk for NPDES permit holders.  If a nonpoint source fails to 
generate the agreed upon credits, the EPA, consistent with its Trading 
Policy, could require the NPDES permit holder to comply with more 




Additionally, if a NPDES permit holder is not required to conduct 
water quality or BMP installation monitoring, third parties would have a 
greater need for information and could begin to monitor the receiving 
water.  This data collected by third parties could be used to support 
citizen suits to enforce the more stringent NPDES permit terms that 
should apply where actual pollutant loading is higher than presumed by 
modeled estimates or water quality standards are violated.  Since 
improvements to water quality are so difficult to measure, this puts the 
NPDES permit holders in a very difficult position. 
                                                          
 150.  Christoph M. Gross et al., Nitrogen Trading Tool to Facilitate Water Quality Credit 
Trading, J. of Soil and Water Conservation, Vol. 63, No.2, at 44A (March/April 2008), available at 
http://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/21718/PDF.  The model used in the Nitrogen Trading Tool is the 
Nitrogen Loss and Environmental Assessment Package (NLEAP).  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 45A. 
 153.  Id. at 44A. 
 154.  EPA Water Quality Trading Policy, Issuance of Final Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 1608-01, 1612 
(Jan. 13, 2003). 
 155.  Id. 
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In fact, lack of monitoring was part of the rationale for the recent 
legal challenge to the trading provisions in the TMDL for the 
Chesapeake Bay.  According to the plaintiff’s public statement about the 
case, 
the TMDL . . . allows for unmonitored ‘nonpoint’ sources of 
pollution, mainly agricultural operations, to claim unverified 
reductions in nitrogen and phosphorus discharges and sell these 
alleged reductions to ‘point’ source industries like power plants 
and wastewater treatment plants.
156
 
Water quality monitoring in receiving water bodies allows one to 
identify a failure to create real water quality improvements.
157
  However, 
the catch-22 is that even if BMPs are implemented and monitoring is 
required, the data may not show the hoped for improvements if BMP 
installations are too spread out over the landscape. 
The National Research Council’s report on the Mississippi River 
Basin included an evaluation of water quality trading as an option for 
addressing nonpoint agricultural pollution.  Although it identified a 
variety of problems with water quality trading, it noted that the tool 
could “become more useful and widespread” as “monitoring improves” 
and stricter water quality criteria are adopted.
158
  The report emphasized 
that in some situations nonpoint agricultural discharges can be 
“measured accurately” rather than simply estimated to determine whether 
BMPs comply with the program.
159
  One example comes from the San 
Joaquin Valley, where measurements of selenium discharges are taken at 
the irrigation district level.
160
  Although measuring diffuse runoff from 
fields is more difficult than measuring discharges from pipes draining 
irrigation tile systems, there are many fields lined with tiles and 
                                                          
 156.  Advocacy Group Challenges National Water Pollution Trading Model, FOOD AND WATER 
WATCH, http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/pressreleases/nearing-40th-anniversary-of-the-clean-
water-act-advocacy-groups-challenge-national-water-pollution-trading-model/ (last visited Mar. 19, 
2014) (emphasis added) (discussing Food and Water Watch v. EPA, Civil Action No. 12-1639(RC),  
2013 WL 6513826 (Dist. D.C. Dec. 13, 2013)). The case was recently dismissed for lack of standing 
without discussion of the merits of permitting trading. Food and Water Watch v. EPA, Civil Action 
No. 12-1639(RC),  2013 WL 6513826 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2013). 
 157.  Ruppert, supra note 80, at 14.  
 158.  Nat’l Research Council Comm., supra note 23, at 181–82.  A caveat, however, is that: 
“Market-based approaches can become operative only if some enforceable regulatory standard 
provides the initial incentive to which market forces can respond.  The institution providing the 
incentives also must have the appropriate geographical reach required to accomplish the pollution 
reduction goals and adequate enforcement authority.”  Id. at 184. 
 159.  Id. at 182. 
 160.  Id. 
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The Iowa Soybeans Association has also had success collaborating 
with farmers to increase productivity and measure and improve 
environmental performance.  They are focusing on reducing nitrogen 
runoff and explicitly using adaptive management.
162
  They plan at the 
watershed level and then work with a “majority of production acres 
across a given watershed in order to realize water quality gains.”
163
  
Thus, they are targeting, aggregating, modeling and monitoring.  They 
work “with farmers to help gather and evaluate water quality data to 
characterize waters, identify trends over time, identify emerging 
problems, assess the effectiveness of control programs, and direct 




The Iowa Soybeans Association’s approach could be adopted in 
water quality trading to make trading with nonpoint agricultural sources 
more adaptive.  Such an approach to trading would involve setting up a 
monitoring program and a process for incorporating new information 
gained from experimentation into future management decisions.  
Adaptive trading should combine the use of modeling and monitoring to 
generate the information needed to inform the creation of credits and 
margins of safety to allow a market to function,
165
 inform needed 
adjustments at the field or point source level, and assess overall water 
quality at the watershed scale. 
Consistent with the EPA Trading Policy call for more “ambient 
monitoring” of water quality as part of an overall program evaluation, the 
EPA Policy supports studies “to quantify nonpoint source load 
reductions, validate nonpoint source pollutant removal efficiencies and 
determine whether the anticipated water quality objectives have been 
achieved.”
166
  The EPA’s policy is compatible with adaptive trading 
because it envisions that these evaluations will inform changes to the 
                                                          
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. at 186 (describing adaptive management as “integration of data into management 
decisions for continual improvement”). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  A lack of information can be a hurdle to robust trading.  “This lack of information about 
the relative costs of pollution reduction often prevents realization of the full theoretical benefits that 
could arise from trading.”  Ruppert, supra note 80, at 12. 
 166.  EPA Water Quality Trading Policy, Issuance of Final Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 1608-01, 1612 
(Jan. 13, 2003). 
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program to “ensure that water quality objectives” are achieved.
167
 
Adaptive trading is based on the understanding that models, while 
useful, are oversimplifications subject to error, gaming, and over or 
under predicting due to weather.  Adaptive trading also recognizes the 
variability inherent in reducing agricultural nonpoint source pollution, as 
well as the challenges presented by water quality monitoring.  To 
incorporate adaptive management with water quality trading, there 
should be a multipart process that builds on the scientific findings about 
the need to target and aggregate reductions: 1) assess and rank the largest 
inputs of nutrients and sediment from nonpoint sources in a given 
watershed;
168
 2) allow trading between point sources and the largest 
sources of nonpoint source pollution in the same targeted watershed; and 
3) create a defined and transparent plan for monitoring, data collection, 
data assessment, and taking responsive management actions. 
Focused monitoring should be a priority, even if monitoring water 
quality and BMPs to ensure that they are installed, maintained, and 
working as designed may not be possible for all fields engaged in active 
agricultural runoff reduction.  Agency scientists could identify 
monitoring sites downstream from aggregated BMP installations 
resulting from multiple trades.  That means making a commitment to 
monitoring specific reaches of a river to assess loading from multiple 
sources over time.
169
  It may also mean the agency identifies specific 
BMPs that should be monitored to assess whether they are working as 
designed and reducing pollutant loading.
170
 
Adaptive trading requires a planned approach to information 
generation that raises the question of who is responsible for carrying out 
the monitoring program.  Consistent with the balance struck by Congress 
and the EPA in placing monitoring responsibilities on point sources 
holding NPDES permits, monitoring required for adaptive trading could 
similarly be the responsibility of the point sources and sent into a central 
database maintained by the agency, just as is done for Discharge 
Monitoring Reports. 
                                                          
 167.  Id. 
 168.  For a useful four part process on delineating watersheds, ranking fields, and targeting 
BMPs, see Diebel et al., supra note 62, at 799.  
 169.  This is the approach Idaho has taken on the Boise River.  IDAHO DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
QUALITY, LOWER BOISE RIVER IMPLEMENTATION PLAN TOTAL PHOSPHOROUS xxiii (Dec. 2008), 
available at http://www.deq.idaho.gov/media/451497-_water_data_reports_surface_water_tmdls 
_boise_river_lower_lbr_total_phosphorus_plan_final.pdf.  
 170.  Id.  
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Another decision with adaptive trading is how the information will 
be incorporated into management decisions.  Oregon’s adaptive 
management approach is to require a regular watershed level review by 
the state agency that assesses water quality standards.  Oregon uses a 
five-year review period, which is consistent with the term of NPDES 
permits for point sources, and presents a logical timeframe for adaptive 
trading.  If the information generated through monitoring shows that 
water quality standards are not being met, the agency needs to have the 
authority and duty, again preferably within a specific amount of time, to 
revise individual permits or contracts.
171
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Agricultural nonpoint water pollution, which has been primarily 
addressed through state-led voluntary programs, will remain the largest 
source of water pollution in the U.S. unless an effective new approach is 
found.  While more targeted funding and prescriptive approaches could 
yield more reliable water quality improvements, since these approaches 
have not been politically viable, the EPA has turned its attention to water 
quality trading between point and nonpoint sources.  Water quality 
trading is still in an experimental phase and could benefit from applying 
adaptive management to create an intentional experimental design.  
Adaptive trading, as envisioned in this article, proposes the use of a 
multipart process: 1) assess and rank the largest inputs of nutrients and 
sediment from nonpoint sources in a given watershed; 2) allow trading 
between point sources and the largest sources of nonpoint source 
pollution in the same targeted watershed; and 3) create a defined and 
transparent plan for monitoring, data collection, data assessment, and 
taking responsive management actions.  The use of adaptive trading, 
while not simple, will provide a means to determine water quality 
progress, define trends, and enlarge the understanding of complex 
systems.  This level of detail is essential to determine whether water 
quality trading is solving chronic problems with agricultural runoff or 
whether the EPA should be championing a different solution. 
                                                          
 171.  Oregon outlines that it will make revisions if standards are not met.  OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
QUALITY, WILLAMETTE BASIN TMDL 14–20 (2006), available at http://www.deq.state. 
or.us/wq/tmdls/willamette.htm; OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, ROGUE RIVER BASIN TMDL, ch. 4, 
figure 4.2, at 4-3 (2008), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/tmdls/docs/roguebasin/Rogue/ 
Chapter4WQMP. 
